By Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch
Welcome back to Foreign Policy’s SitRep! Jack and Robbie here.
Alright, here’s what’s on tap for the day: Biden redesignates the Houthis in Yemen as a terrorist group, a top contender for NATO’s next secretary-general emerges, unmanned U.S. Navy ships patrol the Asia-Pacific, and more.
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Houthi fighters brandish weapons during a protest following U.S. and British airstrikes in Sanaa, Yemen, on Jan. 12, amid Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea.Mohammed Huwais/AFP via Getty Images
Let’s say, hypothetically, that there’s a militant group launching attacks on a strategic global shipping lane. You’re scrambling to find ways to stop them and don’t think airstrikes are enough, so you want to go after the group’s financial networks.
If you’re the U.S. president, you’ve got two primary options. (Don’t worry, since it’s the U.S. government we’re talking about, they both come with acronyms and convoluted, overlapping legal underpinnings.)
Option 1 is to label the group a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) group. In the sanctions world, this is equivalent to tackling the problem with a knife or scalpel.
Option 2 is to label the group a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). This is the sledgehammer option.
Door number one, please. This week, the Biden administration chose Option 1, redesignating the Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen as an SDGT group, following a spate of Houthi attacks on global maritime trade in the Red Sea, a strategic chokepoint for global trade.
We say “redesignate” because the Biden administration removed the Houthis from both the FTO and SDGT lists back in 2021 to grease the wheels for a diplomatic solution to Yemen’s long-standing war between the Houthis and Saudi-backed forces and to alleviate humanitarian suffering. (Yemen’s civil war has transformed the country into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis for years.) Clearly, that hasn’t worked out so well, a point that Republican critics of the administration are eager to point out.
Scalpel versus sledgehammer. One of the main reasons the Biden administration went the “scalpel” versus the “sledgehammer” route centers on that dire humanitarian crisis. Humanitarian organizations providing lifesaving aid to Yemeni civilians in Houthi-controlled territories warn that terrorism designations will have a chilling effect on aid groups, financial institutions, suppliers, and the local economy at a time when these civilians need help the most.
This is where that wonky distinction between FTO and SDGT comes in.
Both options trigger economic sanctions, but the FTO designation goes much further and authorizes sanctions on any group that provides “material support” to the terrorist organization and opens those groups up to criminal prosecution.
The FTO list was established by Congress and thus gives the president a lot less latitude on when and how to implement consequences for violating this designation. The SDGT designation, meanwhile, is established by executive order and therefore gives the president much more leeway on when and how to implement those sanctions, target groups that provide support to terrorist organizations, and offer exceptions or carve-outs.
Why aid groups care so much. For aid organizations, this is a major difference. There’s a risk that lifesaving supplies that an aid organization delivers to Yemeni civilians could end up in the hands of Houthi bosses, who could theoretically sell those goods to fund their war effort or hand them off to their fighters. Does this mean the well-intentioned aid organization provided material support to a terrorist group in the eyes of U.S. prosecutors? What about the shipping company that delivered those supplies? The insurance company that underwrote the shipping company? Under FTO, there’s a (theoretically) higher risk for everyone in this supply chain. And theoretical risk is sometimes all it takes for companies to press pause on any flows of supplies into Yemen.
The FTO listing “is a big exposure to criminal liability that makes a lot of humanitarian organizations very nervous, and there’s no easy way to waive those FTO consequences,” said Scott Anderson, a former State Department lawyer and senior editor at the Lawfare Institute. The SDGT option is “a lot more nimble,” he said.
Already, the administration has issued general licenses, or carve-outs, to the new SDGT designation to assuage the concerns of aid groups. That may not be enough, however.
The chilling effect. “Humanitarian exemptions alone are often not enough to mitigate harm from sanctions,” said Anastasia Moran of the International Rescue Committee, a leading humanitarian organization. “Civilians also require functional health systems and markets. Yemen is extremely dependent on imports for commercial goods, including for the majority of its food, medicine, and fuel.” Even with carve-outs, she said, “there is likely to be a serious chilling effect.”
Then on the other side… There’s a whole host of Republican lawmakers who are criticizing the Biden administration for not going far enough. (Quelle surprise.)
A chorus of Republican voices criticized President Joe Biden over the SDGT move because they want him to go the sledgehammer route and relist the Houthis as an FTO. In their eyes, the SDGT designation is a “watered down” version of the FTO option that appeases the Iran-backed rebel group.
And what about the practical effects? If Houthi fighters all had savings accounts at U.S. banks and ran their business expenses through the Western-dominated international financial system—a coffee machine for the office, an OTR-21 Tochka ballistic missile, etc.—either the SDGT or FTO designation would have a swift and noticeable effect.
But, alas, they don’t. Yemen is already largely isolated from the international financial system after years of war, and the Houthis (as well as their patrons in Tehran) are well versed in avoiding Western sanctions, leaving the question of how big an impact this new designation can really have.
There’s a chance this designation could start to cut off or stymie the flow of money and supplies to the Houthis through illicit trade networks that U.S. intelligence services and sanctions experts already have their eyes on.
But some analysts say the new designation is ultimately more symbolic than anything. “This action is unlikely to deter the Houthis or Iran,” said Mick Mulroy, a former CIA paramilitary operations officer and a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Trump administration. “We will likely continue to see attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and we will continue to see the U.S. and our allies in the coalition attempting to stem the flow of weapons into Yemen from Iran and eliminating the weapons in Yemen before they launch.” Which means that, ultimately, we’re back to airstrikes.
Biden’s special Middle East envoy on humanitarian issues, David Satterfield, is set to leave the job in the coming weeks, HuffPost reports.
Biden nominated Nelson Cunningham to be the next deputy U.S. trade representative. James Ives was nominated as the Treasury Department’s next inspector general.
Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, a top aide in the office of U.S. climate envoy John Kerry, is Biden’s pick to be executive director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
What should be high on your radar, if it isn’t already.
The next NATO chief? Former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte has emerged as the front-runner to become the next NATO secretary-general, former senior U.S. and NATO officials tell Foreign Policy.
Rutte was offered the job last year and declined, but that was before some disappointing election results that led him to resign his post. The process of choosing a new NATO chief is notoriously opaque, as each of the alliance’s 31 countries has to have a say in the closed-door negotiations.
Jens Stoltenberg has been on the job since 2014 and has tried to quit twice, but NATO members keep dragging him back from the sweet release of retirement because of his relative popularity during a time of crisis (thanks to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) and because they couldn’t agree on a viable replacement. The next NATO secretary-general is expected to be announced during the major alliance summit in July in Washington.
Narrow escape. British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s effort to deport asylum-seekers in the United Kingdom to Rwanda has made it through a key parliamentary vote, although he didn’t come out of the process unscathed in terms of his reelection hopes. The House of Commons approved the controversial plan on Wednesday by a 320-to-276 vote, after some Conservative lawmakers threatened revolt and attempted to toughen the legislation the day before. Sunak could face challenges on the legality of the plan in the House of Lords, too. The Guardian reports that the first 100 deportees have already been selected, and some may mount legal challenges to stay put.
Unmanned. The U.S. Navy’s first deployment of unmanned ships is complete. After a five-month deployment that saw four unmanned surface vessels depart southern California and sail nearly 50,000 combined nautical miles, making stops at ports in Australia and Japan, Navy officials said the deployment was successful and the ships are nearly ready to go for forward-deployed operations. Each of the ships, known by the names Sea Hunter, Sea Hawk, Mariner, and Ranger, spent about 50 days in purely autonomous mode during the journey.
UNpacking cybercrime. After nearly five years of international diplomacy played out over track changes in a document, the United Nations is set to begin its final negotiating session for a new cybercrime treaty.
Pushed by Russia, China, and their allies, the original draft treaty aims to significantly expand the scope of enforceable crimes in a way that activists and Western governments fear will bolster authoritarian surveillance powers. The United States believes it has the votes to pass a narrower version of the treaty without some of the most damaging provisions, but that is still by no means a given.
“The aim is to arrive at a consensus instrument. It is unclear whether we will have the time to do that,” a State Department official told reporters on Thursday ahead of the negotiations. “We think the numbers are good for that, but there’s always, always uncertainty.” More context on the treaty in our story from last August.
A voter holds up a sign that reads “Boo” while a spokesperson for Vivek Ramaswamy speaks at a caucus at Franklin Junior High in Des Moines, Iowa, on Jan. 15. Ramaswamy suspended his nomination for the Republican presidential nomination after finishing fourth and endorsed Donald Trump. Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images
Thursday, Jan. 18: Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba speak at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi travels to Brazil and Jamaica.
Friday, Jan. 19: Uganda hosts the 19th Non-Aligned Movement summit.
“Can I ask—can the ambulance not show up with lights and sirens? Uhm, we’re trying to remain a little subtle.”
—An aide to U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, on a 911 call to request an ambulance after the Pentagon chief suffered complications from prostate cancer surgery on Jan. 1. Austin’s decision not to immediately inform the president or other top administration officials of his hospitalization has drawn intense criticism from lawmakers.
The dogs of war. Last Thursday, the massive USS Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier launched F/A-18 fighter jets to launch strikes against the Houthis in Yemen. But just because it was a busy weekend aboard the carrier didn’t mean that there wasn’t time left to post dog photos. By Saturday, Capt. Christopher Hill was back to posting pics of “Captain Demo,” a golden retriever and one of the vessel’s unofficial mascots, to X (formerly Twitter).
