A New West African Security Pact Is Bound to Fail

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have announced a new defense pact called the Alliance of Sahel States. The pact commits each country to come to the others’ aid in defense of their territorial integrity both from internal and external aggression. While the ideological linchpin behind this newfound alliance among autocratic rulers on the surface appears to be addressing security concerns, in reality it is mostly directed at France.

Collectively, these states do not have what it takes militarily and economically to fight off the threat of violent extremism, let alone guarantee the sustenance of a defense pact, given the logistical technicalities involved. Even more important is that they lack the state capacity to address the underlying root causes of violent extremism, some of which include deteriorating socioeconomic conditions such as poverty, youth unemployment, inequality, illiteracy, poor governance, and environmental degradation. Their institutions are simply too weak.

In Burkina Faso, when the junta suspended the constitution following its seizure of political power, a central argument at the time was that security in the country under the watch of the democratically elected president had deteriorated significantly and that there was a need for it to salvage the country from an impending takeover by violent extremist groups. The junta in Niger cited the same reason in justifying its unconstitutional takeover.

But the opposite has occurred. Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project reveals that insecurity in Burkina Faso has taken a turn for the worse since the junta took power. Prior to the coup in Niger, the country had witnessed a decline in violent extremist-related activities. However, the case now appears to be the reverse, with an increase in the number of attacks following the coup a few months ago.

Indeed, none of the countries that make up the new alliance has the military strength to defeat the growing threat posed by violent extremism in the troubled region. When combined, they still lack what it takes to wage the kind of irregular warfare required to bring an end to the turbulence. This reality is reinforced by the fact that they are inadequately trained and lack the manpower and advanced military equipment and technology needed.

This partly explains why France and the European Union got involved in the region in the first place through efforts like the G5 Sahel, which aim to reduce insecurity by providing countries with financial support. But the coups are simply another military solution to a non-military problem. This will likely contribute to the Sahel’s protracted war as it does not address the root causes of violent extremism—raising the fundamental question of why the alliance formed and what it says about France’s neo-colonial influence in Francophone West Africa going forward.

The alliance is a convenient arrangement adopted by the putschists to mask their fear of uncertainty in a climate of heightened tension with France. This also explains why anger directed at France appears to have emerged recently, as the putschists have taken advantage of the popular perception in the region that the democratically elected leaders were simply France’s puppets.

While France has refused to recognize the junta in Niger, French President Emmanuel Macron described the situation of the French ambassador in Niger as being “held hostage”; he was later evacuated to France. France appears to be running out of patience with the putschists in the Sahel and could potentially carry out a surgical rescue operation for Niger’s overthrown president, Mohamed Bazoum, in an effort to redeem its battered image in the region. So far, it has begun withdrawing its troops from Niger.

Contrary to what some analysts and observers envisage—which is that this move signals a complete end to France’s neo-colonial influence and relevance in the region—the new alliance creates an opportunity for France to re-exert its influence toward coastal states that include Ivory Coast, Benin, Togo, and Ghana. The activities of violent extremists in the Sahel over the years have begun expanding southward, thereby resulting in a shift toward these states.

Whether or not France is able to redeem its influence by offering early support to these coastal states will be key to determining what is left of its faltering strategic relevance in West Africa. While these states would be open to the idea of security force assistance from France, given historic ties, Ghana is an Anglophone West African country and is thus less likely to welcome French influence. In anticipation of emerging threats heading southward, Ghana had already established the Accra Initiative, a regional security arrangement aimed at preventing the spillover of terrorism from the Sahel.

Russia remains the greatest beneficiary of France’s misguided adventure in the Sahel. Moscow also seeks to fill the vacuum created by France’s eventual exit and is keen to stop at nothing, including the tactical use of disinformation, to discredit France in West Africa. This has been achieved through the Russian television network RT and the radio channel Sputnik, which broadcast in several languages including French, English, and Arabic. Russia has also done this through the Wagner Group, which utilizes fake news outlets and influencers to spread its narrative. Despite the death of Wagner’s founder and former leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s military presence and power continue to grow in Africa.

The new Alliance of Sahel States is bound to fail given that it is built on a faulty foundation—a reaction to a perceived threat from France rather than a proactive posture toward the real threat of violent extremism. However, its potential to embolden would-be putschists across West Africa should not be ignored.

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