Where the Resistance Rules in Myanmar

KAYAH STATE, Myanmar—Just over three years ago, Thar Thakhin woke up a wanted man. A prominent political writer, he had authored poems skewering the Myanmar military and a book lionizing Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi. His work had won him admiration, particularly among supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party. When the Myanmar military overthrew the NLD government in a coup on Feb. 1, 2021, arresting politicians, activists, and celebrities, it put a target on Thar Thakhin’s back.

Days after the coup, he fled his native region of Magway in central Myanmar and went southeast, toward territory controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU), Myanmar’s oldest ethnic armed organization. Since the 1940s, the KNU has fought for political autonomy and federalism, causes long taken up by Myanmar’s ethnic minorities and increasingly embraced by the general public. In turn, the KNU has closely allied with Myanmar’s broad pro-democracy uprising, training and supporting armed groups formed in response to the coup.

But to the north of the KNU’s scattered territories and jungle camps, in the small state of Kayah, something unexpected was brewing. Fierce resistance to military rule exploded across the state immediately after the coup. By last December, anti-regime forces controlled large chunks of territory, including some urban areas—an unusual development in Myanmar’s decades of guerrilla insurgencies. This newly claimed territory includes all of Mese township and most of Demoso township, where Thar Thakhin has lived for nearly a year.

Dissident writer and poet Thar Thakhin poses in his guitar shop in western Demoso township on Jan. 1.

“I feel like we’re already living in a federal democracy here,” Thar Thakhin said. “There are many different political groups working together and everyone here supports or is involved in the revolution.”

The uprising against military rule in Kayah is led by the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF), an armed group founded after the coup. The KNDF has received training and guidance from the Karenni Army, another ethnic armed organization founded in the 1950s, and the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), a communist offshoot that joined forces with the Myanmar military in 2009 but switched sides last year. (The groups have an alliance with the KNU. Karenni troops are occasionally deployed to neighboring Kayin state and vice versa.)

Also in the mix in Kayah are the People’s Defence Forces, a nationwide armed group that is loyal to the National Unity Government (NUG), a parallel cabinet appointed by elected lawmakers deposed in 2021. Before the coup, the state was politically divided, and the Karenni Army was seen as weaker than some other ethnic armed groups despite its decades of insurgency experience. It may not have been powerful enough to restrain the “passion, anger, and commitment of the post-coup resistance,” said Richard Horsey, senior Myanmar advisor at the International Crisis Group.

A rugged opening sheds light on the interior of a bomb shelter built next to a school at a camp for internally displaced people in Demoso on Jan. 4. A month later, at least four children were killed in an airstrike on a different school in the same area.

This allowed the KNDF to launch risky but ambitious offensives and seize more territory. Horsey said the success of the Karenni resistance was somewhat unexpected. “It speaks to the strength and unity of purpose and conviction, the level of mobilization across Kayah and the force-multiplying effect of other post-coup resistance forces that have come to Kayah,” he said. In some other conflict theaters, more cautious armed groups, such as the KNU’s Brigade 4, have had a moderating effect on their allies.

Despite a patchwork of ideologies, the groups in Kayah have cooperated to carve out so-called liberated areas and launched an offensive on the state capital of Loikaw. The assault on Loikaw began last November, two weeks after a trio of ethnic armed organizations launched a major operation in northern Myanmar, seizing swathes of territory including border crossings with China.

Although Karenni resistance groups largely avoid the main highway, they control many secondary roads in the state, such as the one connecting the towns of Demoso and Moebye, another significant development. “It implies [the resistance forces] have the ability—and the military doesn’t have this ability—to constantly disrupt transport on these roads,” Horsey said, adding that this imbalance reflects the pressure the military is under nationwide.

Resistance fighters shop at a local market in Demoso on Jan. 1.

“There were no jobs in my village because of the conflict,” Elizabeth said. “Before the coup, when I was working in my village, it was just for some pocket money. But here I get a real salary, and I can actually support my family.”

Twenty-year-old Elizabeth works at a newly opened clothing shop in the Demoso market on Jan. 1.

In the same market, Zaw Thway, 25, has opened a makeshift barber shop. He lived north of Demoso town in an area that was mostly leveled by fighting in 2021. “My house was hit by a mortar strike and the roof was completely destroyed,” he said, adding that around 300 of the 400 homes in his village were damaged or destroyed. “It’s still a struggle because nowadays commodity prices keep going up. My job can cover things like gasoline and food but it’s not enough to really make a profit.”

But there is a strong community spirit in Demoso. Zaw Thway rents his plot of land from the owner of the beverage wholesaler next door, who charges rent only when Zaw Thway can afford it. Many other shops avoid making a profit, instead donating their proceeds. Thar Thakhin has opened a store selling guitars and lending books, but he only keeps enough money to pay for his cost of living and gives the rest to resistance groups.

His establishment has another, loftier purpose, Thar Thakhin said: “Most of the young people here have guns and in their mindset all they know is fighting and killing. … We need religion and art for people to stay grounded.”

Along the main road running west from Demoso town, dozens of bars, restaurants, and traditional tea shops have sprung up, serving classic Myanmar dishes like mohinga (a fish curry noodle soup), fermented tea leaf salad, and deep-fried samosas, as well as more local specialties like hin htote, a gelatinous dumpling with pork and spring onions.

One roadside shop is famous among resistance fighters for selling them food at a steep discount or giving it away. The owner, Asha, had a similar tea shop in Loikaw but fled the capital in 2021 after the military raided her home and arrested one of her sons. “I have three sons, and two of them are in the resistance and the other one is in a fundraising support group,” she said. “The military knew my son was supporting [the resistance] so the soldiers stormed our house and said, ‘Give us your son or we’ll shoot your entire family.’”

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A tattoo artist works in his makeshift studio next to the camp for internally displaced people where he lives in Demoso on Jan. 4. He was displaced by fighting in 2021.

Although Asha feels safer in Demoso than she did in Loikaw, she still pines for home. “It’s not completely safe here, since we still have to worry here about things like airstrikes, but it’s much better than living in Loikaw,” she said. “If we could go back safely we would go right away.”

Not everyone finds it easy to make ends meet, particularly those who lack the skills or capital needed to start a new business. Cecilia, a farmer, said she can’t return to her family home in east Demoso, which was destroyed by air strikes and artillery fire in 2022. She said that over time donations from the community and the Myanmar diaspora have dwindled. “We have to rebuild our house and repair our farm,” Cecilia said. “After this war ends, we will have to start over again completely.”

Each of the internally displaced people interviewed by Foreign Policy had relocated two or three times since the conflict began. Marwi, the deputy commander of the KNDF, said the Myanmar military has pulled its forces back to defend Loikaw, leaving some previously unstable areas in the hands of the resistance. He said the KNDF is encouraging people to go back to these areas to farm while they can. “The people’s resilience is the fuel of the revolution,” he said.

A Karenni Army soldier flashes the three-finger pro-democracy salute at a betel nut shop in Mese township on Dec. 25, 2023.

With the military facing widespread resistance across Myanmar, it must pick its battles. Horsey said Loikaw is a major priority: It is a state capital that is not far from the national capital, Naypyitaw, and is close to important hydropower projects. A town like Mese—nestled between a river, a mountain range, and the Thai border—is somewhere the military likely feels it can return to later. Demoso town falls somewhere in between.

“With Demoso things could change quickly. Right now, that doesn’t look to be a huge threat,” Horsey said. “But if fighting was over in Loikaw, would it then come back to these other areas? That’s the question.”

“Everything is reversible,” he warned. “Areas are liberated until they’re not.”