Another Trump Presidency Won’t Much Change U.S. Foreign Policy

Barring some unforeseen turn of events, the 2024 U.S. presidential election will be a rematch between incumbent President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump. Although most Americans would be happier if neither was running, that’s not the choice they are likely to face in November. The election is already being framed as a watershed event that will have far-reaching effects on American democracy and its approach to the rest of the world.

On the first issue—the likely consequences here at home—the choice is clear. Trump is a convicted fraudster, sexual abuser, and serially incompetent chief executive during his previous term as president. His commitment to democratic principles and the rule of law is nonexistent, and there are worrisome signs that he and the Republican Party intend to use a second term to punish political opponents and move the United States toward de facto autocracy. Women’s rights will be further curtailed, efforts to halt climate change will be abandoned, and wealthy Americans and corporations will be free to pursue their own selfish interests with scant regard for the broader social and political consequences. Whatever you may think of Biden or his policies, he’s not likely to do any of those things. And for me that is sufficient reason to cast an enthusiastic vote against Trump.

But if we turn to foreign policy, the differences are not so stark. Although many people now fear that a second Trump term would have dramatic effects on U.S. foreign policy, I suspect the differences will be less significant than you might think. Trump will be erratic, mercurial, boorish, and confrontational—especially toward America’s NATO allies—just as he was during his first term. But in other respects, a second Trump term may not be that different from what Biden would do should he win another four years in office. To see this, consider how each man is likely to deal with what are arguably the three most important items on today’s foreign-policy agenda: Ukraine, China, and the Middle East.

1. Ukraine

The Biden administration has been all-in on Ukraine since the war started, despite opposition from some members of the GOP and growing pessimism about Kyiv’s ability to win the war or recover its lost territory. Ukrainians and their Western supporters worry that Trump will pull the plug on U.S. support and leave Ukraine dependent on whatever help it can get from Europe and at the mercy of the Russian army. With typical bombast, Trump has boasted he could solve the war “in one day” and then waffled when asked if he wants Ukraine to win. Accordingly, you might think a Trump election would bring a sea change in U.S. policy.

But here’s the rub: Biden is likely to follow a similar path if he wins another term, even if he pursues it in a different way. The tides of war turned against Ukraine in 2023, and although its supporters keep coming up with optimistic schemes for reversing its fortunes and liberating the territory that Russia has illegally conquered and annexed, their hopes are almost certainly illusory, and the Defense Department probably knows it. Biden & Co. aren’t going to admit this prior to the election, because it would cast doubt on their handling of the war up until now. If returned to office, however, they are likely to pressure Kyiv to adopt more realistic objectives and to move toward a settlement.

I believe Biden would do this in a measured way and try to help Kyiv strike the best deal it could. By contrast, Trump would probably exhibit the same diplomatic skill he showed in his amateurish bromance with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un (that is to say, none) and be more inclined to cut and run. The broader point, however, is that both administrations will try to negotiate an end to the war after January 2025, and the resulting deal is likely to be a lot closer to Russia’s stated war aims than Kyiv’s.

2. China

During his first term, Trump broke decisively with earlier U.S. policies of economic engagement with China and launched a poorly designed trade war that hurt the U.S. economy and had little or no effect on the bilateral trade deficit that it was supposed to correct. Biden refashioned this approach and doubled down on it, imposing increasingly stringent export controls intended to hamstring Chinese efforts to master several key areas of advanced technology. Rejecting overt protectionism, administration officials defended this approach as narrowly focused on national security concerns (i.e., a “small yard” with a “high fence”). The size of the yard keeps growing, however, and a more confrontational approach toward China is one of the few issues that enjoys a strong bipartisan consensus.

For this reason, U.S. policy toward China isn’t going to change very much no matter what the outcome is next November. Official statements by the Biden administration and the previous Trump administration identified China as one of the main challengers to U.S. global primacy, and that view is, if anything, even more pronounced today. Trump may adopt a somewhat more confrontational attitude toward America’s Asian allies (whom he’s repeatedly accused of being overly reliant on American protection), but he can’t abandon them if he’s serious about standing up to Beijing.

The bottom line: When it comes to relations with China, both Biden and Trump would be singing from the same choir book in their second term.

3. The Middle East

Given the trainwreck that is U.S. Middle East policy, you might think that both Biden and Trump would be eager to change course in 2025. Sadly, there’s no reason to expect either president to behave differently in the future than they did in the past. Indeed, what is most striking is how similarly these two very different presidents have acted when dealing with this volatile region.

As president, Trump abandoned the nuclear deal that had capped Iran’s nuclear program, moved the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and closed the U.S. consular office for Palestinian issues in Washington. He also appointed a rabidly pro-settler lawyer as U.S. ambassador to Israel. His peace plan made a mockery of the long-standing U.S. goal of a two-state solution, while backing amateur diplomat (and son-in-law) Jared Kushner’s scheme for Arab-Israeli normalization. The resulting Abraham Accords established diplomatic relations between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Sudan (the latter now engulfed in civil war) and did nothing to address the plight of the 5 million Palestinians living under harsh Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

What did Biden do when he inherited this situation? He made it worse. Despite a campaign pledge to rejoin the nuclear deal with Iran, he dithered until elections in Iran brought hard-liners to power and made returning to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action even more difficult. Result: Iran is now closer to the bomb than ever. Biden and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken treated the Palestinians much as Trump had, delaying the reopening of the Jerusalem consulate, devoting little effort to restarting a peace process, and turning a blind eye to the increasing acts of violence by Israeli settlers on the West Bank, actions tolerated if not openly supported by the most far-right government in Israel’s history.

Just like Trump, Biden and Blinken focused instead on currying favor with Saudi Arabia, in a complete reversal of Biden’s campaign promise to treat Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as a “pariah” for his role in the murder of exiled journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Under the guidance of Brett McGurk, whose presence across Republican and Democratic administrations has made him perhaps the single most influential architect of U.S. policy in recent years, the United States spent the last year trying to consummate a deal giving Saudi Arabia a security guarantee (and some other goodies) in exchange for normalization with Israel. The Palestinian issue was sidelined once again, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan boasted last fall that the Middle East was “quieter than it has been for decades.”

These errors—beginning with Trump and continued by Biden—caused the backfire heard ‘round the world. Facing the prospect of permanent subordination and slow-motion extinction, on Oct. 7, Hamas fighters broke out of the open-air Gaza prison and launched a brutal attack on border communities in Israel. Their indefensibly brutal assault on Israeli civilians was a serious crime, but Israel’s ferocious, disproportionate, and arguably genocidal response is an even more serious stain on Israel’s image, America’s reputation, and the world’s conscience.

And how did the United States, whose secretary of state once said human rights would be “at the center of U.S. foreign policy,” respond to this diplomatic and humanitarian catastrophe? By rushing billions of dollar’s worth of military aid to the country whose bombs have already killed more than 23,000 Palestinians in Gaza (reportedly circumventing U.S. law in the process), by vetoing U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire, and by dismissing South Africa’s extensively documented application to the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide as “meritless.” Administration officials have reportedly asked Israel to moderate its actions but have not threatened to curtail U.S. support. Predictably, the Netanyahu government has ignored U.S. requests.

There’s no reason to expect anything different no matter who wins next year. Both Biden and Blinken are self-proclaimed Zionists, and neither is likely to exert any meaningful pressure on Israel to change course. Trump never seemed to care about either side very much, but he does understand the balance of political influence in America, and his anti-Muslim bias is well-documented. A second Biden term might see an attempt to revive some sort of peace process, but nobody should be fooled into thinking it will accomplish more than America’s previous efforts did. After all, the man who reportedly undercut former President Barack Obama’s efforts to achieve a two-state solution is not likely to achieve one even if he gets another term. For his part, Trump is more likely to follow the money, just as his son-in-law did. As with Ukraine and China, the similarities in approach outweigh the differences in worldview and diplomatic style.

To be clear, I’m not saying that this election will have zero effect on U.S. foreign policy. Trump may try to take the United States out of NATO, for example, although such a move would undoubtedly face enormous resistance from the foreign and defense policy establishment. He may focus primarily on his domestic agenda—and his lingering legal troubles—which would further reduce his already-limited interest in foreign affairs and tend to reinforce the existing status quo. Trump was a poor judge of foreign-policy talent during his first term (and provoked unprecedented rates of staff turnover), and that tendency may hamstring U.S. policy implementation and lead foreign governments to hedge even more. There would be subtle differences between Biden 2 and Trump 2, but I’d bet against a radical transformation.

On balance, the upcoming election will have a far greater impact on U.S. domestic politics than on key issues of foreign policy. As I noted at the outset, the stakes at home are sufficiently large and clear-cut—and sufficiently worrisome—that I won’t have much trouble deciding how to vote. Because I like living in a democracy, I just hope a majority of voters in enough key states agree with me come November.