What Gulf States Want in Gaza

Three months ago, Hamas launched an unprecedented attack on Israel, which swiftly responded with an operation to eradicate the militant group. So far, around 1,200 Israelis and an estimated more than 23,000 Palestinians have died, with many more injured. Amid calls for a cease-fire, many observers are speculating what a “day after” might look like in the Gaza Strip.

Whether or not Hamas can be destroyed is a matter of considerable debate. Regardless, Israel and the United States—its most important ally—have insisted that the group can have no role in Gaza’s future administration. Instead, both have proposed the establishment of a multinational force that would include a role for Arab states—including those in the Persian Gulf. This means that Gaza could become a hot spot for geopolitical rivalries between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Qatar is at the center of this conflict. Its capital, Doha, has hosted and financially bolstered Hamas’s political wing since 2012, when it relocated from Damascus—providing Gaza with much-needed humanitarian assistance. Qatar’s support for Hamas is part of a broader geopolitical strategy to back Islamist groups, particularly those associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, along with allies Iran and Turkey. This counterbalances Qatar’s regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The small Gulf sheikhdom fashions itself something of a regional diplomat—and views diplomacy as a way to protect itself in a turbulent neighborhood. Since its traumatic 2017-to-2021 blockade, this has proved effective: Qatar moderated high-stakes talks like those between the United States and Taliban in 2020. It also secured the release of U.S. prisoners held in Iran in 2023.

The United States had previously requested that Qatar open a line of communication with Hamas in 2006 after the group’s legislative victory in the Palestinian territories, which preceded its 2007 takeover of Gaza and the Israeli blockade that followed. Since then, Doha—which does not have official relations with Israel—has actively mediated between Hamas and Israel on at least three occasions: in 2015, 2018, and 2021.

This time, Qatar is hoping to secure the release of remaining hostages held by Hamas—most of them Israeli—in exchange for a cease-fire or a humanitarian pause. From Nov. 24 to Dec. 1, 2023, ongoing talks resulted in the release of 110 hostages from Gaza and 240 Palestinian prisoners from Israel.

Qatar may go on to support nonmilitant members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza after the war. (These could include members of Hamas’s political—rather than military—wing.) Doing so would satisfy U.S. and Israeli calls for Gaza to be rid of Hamas while also helping Doha to maintain its alliances with Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Iran—countering the influence of the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has long competed with Iran for Islamic and regional leadership. Ever since the late Saudi King Abdullah launched what he called the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002, Riyadh has also supported the Arab-Israeli peace process. While Tehran—and Doha—financially and militarily back Hamas, Riyadh supports the Palestinian Authority (PA) and might wish to install the PA—which partially governs the West Bank—in postwar Gaza.

However, this could be difficult to implement. While U.S. President Joe Biden has expressed support for a post-Hamas Gaza under what he calls “a revitalized Palestinian Authority,” Israel remains opposed to any PA rule in the territory. What’s more, the PA, which many view as a proxy of Israeli occupation, is reviled by Palestinians—while Hamas’s popularity has soared. For PA rule in Gaza to be possible, Riyadh and Washington would need to do the difficult task of identifying a leader who is both accepted by Israel but also popular enough among Palestinians to dampen Hamas’s—and Iran’s—pull.

One potential candidate is former PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. Fayyad, a pragmatic leader, received support from the United States and Saudi Arabia during his tenure from 2007 to 2013. He also held talks with Hamas in 2021 in an unsuccessful attempt to form a national Palestinian unity government. In the past, Fayyad has suggested including Hamas under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization. While Fayyad has not commented publicly about the possibility of leading Gaza now, Saudi media reported in early January that his name has been mentioned by international diplomats in private discussions on the matter.

Before Oct. 7, Israel and Saudi Arabia had seemed to be moving toward normalization. The Biden administration had tentatively agreed to ambitious requests from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, including a NATO-style security pact, access to advanced weaponry, and a civilian nuclear program. The crown prince told U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken last week that normalization was still in the cards after the war ends—provided that there is also a road map to Palestinian statehood.

Saudi leverage in normalization talks might unsettle the UAE. Though the two countries are ostensibly allies—especially opposite Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood—they have stepped up their geopolitical competition in recent years in their respective quests to become the preeminent Gulf power. Both states have vied for regional dominance in the wars in Yemen and Sudan. The Arab-Israeli peace process in general—and discussions over Gaza’s future—could escalate this rivalry further.

Abu Dhabi seeks to wield a moderating influence on the war while safeguarding its own regional interests. In addition to condemning Israel’s attacks on Gazan hospitals, the UAE has been proactive in getting aid into the enclave, particularly at the United Nations. That is in part because the UAE, which balances relations between major powers such as Russia and the United States, has expansionist ambitions. In addition to Yemen and Sudan, Abu Dhabi also backs proxies in conflicts in the Horn of Africa and Libya.

The UAE’s 2020 normalization of relations with Israel was another such strategic move. Yet the country remains cautious of potential shifts in regional power dynamics, and particularly the prospect of Saudi-Israeli normalization. Emirati détente was, in part, an attempt to become the preeminent Arab power that can effect change on Palestine, wrestling that mantle away from Saudi Arabia. If Riyadh normalizes with Israel, it will be able to reclaim the Palestinian file.

Abu Dhabi may be considering Mohammed Dahlan to manage Gaza within the framework of Biden’s “revitalized” PA. Dahlan, a prominent former leader of the PA’s leading Fatah party and a native of Gaza, was once its security chief. However, Dahlan is now despised in Gaza because he spent years battling Hamas. In the eyes of many Gazans, he is no better than an Israeli occupier.

Dahlan has lived in exile in Abu Dhabi since 2011 after allegations of involvement in financial corruption and the assassination of Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. He is thought to have influenced and mediated Israeli-UAE normalization. Although the former Fatah leader has publicly rejected playing a role in a post-Hamas Gaza, Dahlan has also hinted that he is open to leading Palestinian politics in the future. This would bring strategic dividends for the UAE.

Dahlan maintains a strong relationship with Egypt, one of the two neighboring countries with official ties to Israel. The other is Jordan. Both must be included in any international diplomatic discussion over Gaza’s future—and could find themselves pulled into Gulf rivalries.

Jordan, which borders the West Bank and occupied the territory from 1948 to 1967, is home to a large Palestinian refugee population. Amman’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel recognizes the Hashemite monarchy’s custodianship of Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem—providing the country with an image of regional prestige, leadership, and religious significance. And in 1979, Egypt, the former occupier of Gaza, became the first Arab country to normalize ties with Israel. Ever since, it has aimed to balance its strategic relationship with Israel with popular support for the Palestinians and the need to maintain stability along its borders.

With most Gazans barred from Israel, Egypt’s Rafah border crossing is their main exit route. The border area also harbors Hamas’s smuggling tunnels. During this war, Cairo has helped control the Rafah crossing and shared intelligence with Israel, while President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has attempted to position himself as a mediator by hosting an international summit. Jordan has similarly convened U.S. and Arab leaders.

But both countries suffer from vulnerabilities that could be exploited by Gulf powers eager to play a leading role in post-Hamas Gaza. They are much poorer than their Gulf counterparts, and their respective economies are in dire states—fueling popular anger even in repressive political environments.

Amman has received relief aid from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations since 2018 and has become especially dependent on support from the group due to COVID-19 pandemic-induced pressures. Egypt was struggling economically before the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, but these crises—and their impact on food and fuel prices—have only made things worse. Sisi is under more scrutiny than ever.

In Egypt, Qatar could wield leverage by urging the government to ease pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood, which won Egypt’s first—and only—democratic election in 2012 and was subsequently labeled a terrorist organization after Sisi’s military took over in a 2013 coup. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could exert sway Egypt to impact the wars in Sudan, Libya, and in Yemen.

Influence over Jordan would grant Gulf countries access to—and possible control over—the West Bank and East Jerusalem. National Defense University’s Michael Sharnoff argued in Foreign Policy in 2021 that Saudi Arabia wished to displace Jordan as the custodian of Jerusalem’s holy sites. Saudi Arabia’s demand to get this distinction would strengthen Riyadh’s hand in normalization talks with Israel and boost Riyadh’s image of being at the forefront of Islamic and Arab leadership—adding the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Islam’s third-holiest site) to the kingdom’s custodianship of Mecca and Medina (the first two).

Expanded Gulf influence over Jordan and Egypt could prove detrimental to Palestinians’ already fragile existence—and to the increasingly unrealistic two-state solution—by opening up new schisms in Palestinian society. It would also create a quagmire for the governments in Amman and Cairo. Being affiliated with a GCC state that helps displace Hamas in Gaza could bring much needed financial aid at the risk of alienating constituencies that are increasingly supportive of the militant group.

Intra-Gulf competition in Gaza has already begun. Among other actions, Qatar hosted three-way negotiations with the United States, Hamas, and Israel to allow for temporary pauses in fighting and provisions of humanitarian aid. Saudi Arabia was quick to bring forward its own initiatives, hosting a summit of major regional actors and Muslim-majority countries, such as Iran and Turkey, and announcing Chinese-brokered talks for ending the war. An Israeli start-up signed an agreement with the UAE to set up a land bridge to transfer goods from Dubai through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Israel’s ports following a slate of Houthi attacks on Israeli cargo in the Red Sea.

Israel, the United States, and many Arab leaders are united in wanting to see Hamas’s demise. But in getting rid of one problem, others may arise. The Israel-Hamas war could intensify the growing rivalry among Gulf states—and one source of escalating regional tension may give way to another.