What Russian Elites Think About the Wagner Crisis

Russia’s war in Ukraine took a dramatic turn on Friday when elements of its own forces began turning against each other, fueling fears of an attempted coup sparked by a powerful Russian mercenary tycoon and one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s erstwhile allies.

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mercenary forces took control of the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, as well as parts of Russia’s military command headquarters in southern Russia, after he accused the Russian military of shelling his own forces. In a brief public address on Saturday, Putin pledged to take “decisive actions” against Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group, for what he characterized as a treasonous rebellion. Yet later that same day, Prigozhin announced he was turning his forces back from their march on Moscow after reaching a deal to end the crisis, reportedly brokered by Belarus. It’s unclear how Prigozhin could extricate himself from the crisis after Putin publicly accused him of treason, however.

To make sense of the crisis and what shock waves it might send through Russian elites, Foreign Policy spoke to Tatiana Stanovaya, an expert on Russian politics with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank and the founder of R.Politik, an independent political analysis firm. The interview was conducted before Prigozhin announced his forces were backing down.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

What’s your assessment of the mood among Russian elites and Putin’s inner circle in Moscow now?

So many people in state institutions, in the government security services, the presidential administration, talked about Prigozhin as a threat. Many were surprised and perplexed by the fact that Putin remained so tolerant of this. People theorized there were some hidden agendas. We tracked rumors that Prigozhin was carefully managed by the Kremlin, that he would never fall out of its control. And now we are seeing that yes, actually, he did.

We may now see a response of more repression on all of the Wagner [Group]’s network and infrastructure. People who were linked to Prigozhin will become vulnerable, and they will have to prove to Putin that they are on his side.

Does this constitute a direct threat to Putin’s hold on power?

I don’t really think that there is a significant threat immediately to Putin’s regime or to his power, but it’s certainly a blow to his reputation and image. The absence of any reactions from Putin to all of Prigozhin’s videos and statements attacking the Russian military, these very daring statements, actually opened the door for Prigozhin to go further and further.

That is why Putin bears responsibility in the eyes of the Russian elite. The feeling and sentiment of these people now is that they are feeling like the situation is falling apart: How did we get to this situation? Where is stability? Where is Putin? So this is a really very unusual place for Putin’s regime to be in. Elites before this used to always feel that there is vertical control and a strong state and stability with Putin.

What’s Prigozhin’s endgame here? 

In the beginning yesterday, when he released an interview and video where he said that the military attacked Wagner forces, I think that he aimed to attack only [Defense Minister Sergei] Shoigu and [Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery] Gerasimov.

Then it shifted very abruptly, and we came to this situation where he turned out to lack significant support from serious people in Moscow. I think that he had counted on at least some support. He likely believed that Putin would find himself confronted with a situation where he had to support Prigozhin and dismiss Shoigu. That was a massive miscalculation by Prigozhin.

When Putin gave his public address to Russians and talked about betrayal, for Prigozhin, it was a pivotal point where the conflict turned into a personal problem between Prigozhin and Putin. It was clear then that the situation was impossible to repair. And now Prigozhin has been completely abandoned. And I don’t see any real scenarios for him but to be completely destroyed.

What are the Wagner Group’s chances of success, or even Prigozhin coming out of this mutiny alive, for that matter?

Honestly, I think that the chances of Prigozhin staying alive are very slim. The Russian authorities made clear he must be destroyed. So it’s only a question of the price and the time. But they will try to find any possible way to end this.

Does Prigozhin have any support from other elites in Moscow or Putin’s inner circle?

I don’t believe so. Some other analysts have tried to convince me that Prigozhin has some people in Moscow supporting him. Who? I don’t see anyone. We know that Prigozhin had some contacts with the Federal Protective Service that are responsible for Putin’s personal security. But can I imagine that any of them will switch to support Prigozhin? For me that seems impossible.

Anton Vaino, Putin’s chief of staff, has often played the role of mediator between Putin and Prigozhin, especially during the Syria war. But he’s just an executor of Putin’s orders. He will do what Putin asks, and that’s it.

I can’t imagine now that someone powerful in Moscow, in a normal state of mind, would choose to back Prigozhin. It’s suicide. All these elites who have maintained ties to Prigozhin will likely try to prove that they have nothing to do with him, and they will condemn him to distance themselves from this.

The Wagner Group had operations beyond Ukraine, including in Syria, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan. How could this affect the Wagner Group’s global footprint?

I have doubts that Wagner in Russia could avoid being dismantled and destroyed after this. Then what remains of it in different countries, that’s for Putin to decide. I think that they will try to preserve resources and people and infrastructure of what Wagner had abroad, assess what resources and [troops] to keep and control. The rest they will get rid of.

In an autocratic country where dissent is so stifled, why was Prigozhin allowed to be so critical of the military before this crisis blew up?

Prigozhin was considered in Putin’s eyes as a real patriot, a representative of Russia’s civil society, but a civil society that is worried about Russian strategy. That is why this situation has been so painful for Putin, and why he referred to it as “a stab in the back” from someone who Putin believed was a loyal, patriotic man.

The president’s administration and security elites had their hands tied because they did not have any sign from Putin that they had a right to move against Prigozhin, and they really wanted to. So they had to tolerate him. And even many of them convinced themselves that Prigozhin is someone who is useful for the regime.

Prigozhin felt that there was a space to maneuver, and he started to push the boundaries, and then he felt that he faced no response, no resistance. That started to change in recent weeks, when he was kicked out from Ukraine without a chance to return, and he was losing out on authorities to recruit people in other regions in Russia, and he was not allowed on TV, he felt like he was becoming too vulnerable politically just in face of a huge repressive machine regime that has rallied against him.

So he had to act, and I think in the beginning he thought when he acted that Putin would respond with moves in his favor.

What are you watching for next?

What I’m trying most to understand is how this crisis may deepen a split within Russian society. People are talking much, much more about a possible civil war because of this split, where on the one hand we have a part of society that supports Prigozhin, that is worried with the way the war is going, with an ineffective and corrupt army.

And on the other side there are people saying that in any situation we must stand by the state and support it, and whatever happens, we must consolidate it.

We are seeing hints already. You can see in some Russian Telegram channels, people questioning, “Why have the authorities refused a dialogue with Prigozhin? He deserves it.” And I’m afraid that if this crisis ends on a bitter note, it will fuel more resentment.